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In-kind Conservation Payments Crowd in Environmental Values  38 
and Increase Support for Government Intervention: 39 





There is growing use of economic incentives such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) to 45 
encourage sustainable land management. An important critique is that such approaches may 46 
unintentionally disrupt environmental and social values, ‘crowding out’ pre-existing motivations 47 
to conserve. Some scholars suggest that the use of in-kind payments and norm-based framing, 48 
rather than financial transfers and a market framing, can mitigate these risks. There are calls to use 49 
more robust methods for impact evaluation in environmental policy. We use one of the only 50 
Randomized Controlled Trials of a conservation incentive scheme to evaluate its impact on self-51 
stated environmental and social values and beliefs. Data from before and after the intervention, 52 
from households in villages randomly selected to receive the program or not, demonstrate that the 53 
program increased prioritization of environmental values (evidence of crowding-in as opposed to 54 
crowding out) and altered social beliefs related to inequality and the role of government. The 55 
findings demonstrate that this conservation program had a positive impact on environmental values 56 
and increased the belief that government involvement is appropriate. The scheme, with its use of 57 
in-kind payments and reciprocity framing, offers lessons to those seeking to develop effective 58 
schemes to incentivize positive environmental stewardship. 59 
 60 
Keywords: payments for ecosystem services; motivation crowding; social norms; framing; 61 




1. Introduction 65 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are voluntary transactions whereby land managers are 66 
incentivized to carry out natural resource management actions believed to generate ecosystem 67 
services for another group of users or society as a whole. PES schemes have proven to be a valuable 68 
tool for promoting conservation in vulnerable and critically important ecosystems (Jayachandran 69 
et al. 2017). This approach has been adopted worldwide (Kinzig et al. 2011; Pattanayak, Wunder 70 
& Ferraro 2010) with over 550 ongoing PES programs, representing around US$36-42 billion in 71 
transactions (Salzman et al. 2018).   72 
 73 
A common critique of PES programs is that financial incentives may have adverse effects on pre-74 
existing motivations for conservation, including both environmental and social values and beliefs 75 
(Rode, Gómez-Baggethun & Krause 2015). In particular, critics view PES as engaging in 76 
“commodity fetishism”, reducing complex ecosystem functions to tradeable services (Kosoy & 77 
Corbera 2010, Muradian et al. 2010). A large body of social science research demonstrates that 78 
financial incentives sometimes result in the opposite of their intended effect (Bowles 2008; Deci, 79 
Koestner & Ryan 1999; Frey 1994; Gneezy & Rustichini 2000; Titmuss 1971). This phenomenon, 80 
known as “motivation crowding”, could potentially lead to a decrease in conservation behavior, 81 
especially after the incentive payments end (Andersson et al. 2018). However, the original 82 
psychology literature on motivation crowding suggests that external interventions can sometimes 83 
enhance pre-existing motivations rather than displace them (crowding “in” rather than “out”), if 84 
the external intervention is perceived as congruent with one’s own values and identity (Deci, 85 
Koestner & Ryan 1999).  86 
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 87 
Another, closely related critique of PES programs is that, in practice, they often present barriers to 88 
entry that exclude the poorest members of communities (Bremer, Farley & Lopez-Carr 2014; 89 
Pagiola, Arcenas & Platais 2005). Compensation programs often feature participation skewed 90 
toward wealthier members of a community (Greig-Gran, Porras & Wunder 2005; Zbinden & Lee 91 
2005), and there is a risk that PES schemes may exacerbate pre-existing inequalities between 92 
landowners and others (García-Amado et al. 2011). The tension between equity and efficiency of 93 
market-based mechanisms has been an important concern in the literature (Brown & Adger 2007; 94 
Landell-Mills 2002; Pascual et al. 2010; Wunder 2008). Some caution that a failure to consider 95 
social equity can undermine environmental protection in the long-run through disenchantment with 96 
the program (Pascual et al. 2014). These studies raise concerns about unintended social impacts 97 
that may arise from PES programs, leading scholars to a call for greater inclusion of the poor in 98 
PES (Farley & Costanza 2010). They also raise questions about the potential for motivation 99 
crowding with respect, not only to intrinsic environmental values, but also to pro-social values and 100 
beliefs, especially as they relate to inequality. 101 
 102 
Apart from direct material benefits provided to participants, policies and programmatic 103 
interventions also have interpretive effects (Pierson 1993) which may shape participants’ 104 
“psychological predisposition to participate in public life” and perceptions of “their status in 105 
relation to other citizens and government” (Mettler 2002, p.352). Studies of this dynamic 106 
interaction, aka policy feedback, have largely been focused on social policy in the United States 107 
and Europe (Béland 2010, Campbell 2012), with little attention to the developing country context, 108 
where government policies often co-exist and overlap with programs implemented by international 109 
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and non-governmental organizations. If PES influences the values and beliefs of community 110 
members, this may have long-run implications not only for the specific conservation behavior it 111 
was designed to influence, but also for subsequent policy efforts related to equity in the same 112 
communities. This represents a potential spillover of motivation crowding to other areas of policy 113 
intervention, and warrants attention to the influence of PES on beliefs and values related to 114 
inequality and government intervention, in addition to environmental conservation.  115 
 116 
The introduction to a recent special section on motivation crowding in Ecological Economics 117 
(Ezzine-de-Blas et al. 2019) argued that particular programmatic design features of PES programs, 118 
including for example payment type and communication, will influence the likelihood of crowding 119 
in vs. crowding out, to the extent that they stimulate feelings of competence, autonomy, and 120 
social/environmental relatedness. Prior laboratory research suggests that in-kind payments may be 121 
less prone to crowding out than cash, likely because they evoke social norms rather than a “market 122 
logic” (Heyman & Ariely 2004). Scholars have suggested such in-kind payments may be more 123 
effective in the application of PES (Kerr, Vardhan & Jindal 2014, Chan et al. 2017) but this has 124 
not been tested in a field-based experiment.  125 
 126 
In addition, a growing literature suggests that simply framing an intervention in a particular way 127 
can change how people react to it (Chong and Druckman 2007, Clot et al. 2017) and that the 128 
effectiveness of a particular framing depends on pre-existing norms and beliefs (Andrews et al. 129 
2013). One such pre-existing norm is reciprocity, or the relational notion that people should give 130 
back to those who help them. Recent research exploring the drivers of environmental values has 131 
shown that they can be driven by a perceived relationship with nature (Bremer et al. 2018, Chan 132 
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et al. 2016, 2017). Reciprocity is considered one of several shared principles of moral psychology, 133 
common across many cultures (Haidt 2007) and has been observed to motivate human behavior in 134 
a variety of decision contexts (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Falk & Fischbacher 2006). Taken as a 135 
whole, this suggests that the combination of in-kind compensation and reciprocity framing may 136 
reduce the risks of motivation crowding in incentive schemes. 137 
 138 
A blossoming literature has explored the psychological impact of PES, and PES-like, programs on 139 
individuals, through their motivations, values, beliefs and internalized norms, with few consistent 140 
results. This literature has included a range of methods including ethnographic analyses (Bose, 141 
Garcia & Vira 2019, Van Hecken et al. 2019), structured interviews (García-Amado, Pérez & 142 
García 2013), quasi-experimental approaches (Agrawal, Chhatre & Gerber 2015; Chervier, Le 143 
Velly & Ezzine-de-Blas 2019), regression discontinuity designs (Alix-Garcia et al. 2018) and 144 
framed field experiments (Andersson et al. 2018; Cook et al. 2019; Handberg & Angelsen 2019; 145 
Kaczan, Swallow & Adamowicz 2019; Moros, Valez & Corbera 2019, Kolinjivadi et al. 2019). 146 
There is substantial interest in the use of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) in conservation 147 
(Ferraro & Pattanayak 2006, Bayliss et al. 2015), where units are randomly allocated to receive an 148 
intervention or not, as a robust method of impact evaluation (Banerjee & Duflo 2009). RCTs 149 
overcome many of the challenges of other approaches to allow causal inference (the ability to 150 
conclude that the intervention resulted in the result observed). However, the use of randomized 151 
trials is still very rare in the study of environmental management interventions (Ma et al. 2017). 152 
There are only two published RCT evaluations of PES schemes (Jayachandran et al. 2017; Pynegar 153 
et al. 2018) and none that examine psychological effects on the values and beliefs of participants.  154 
 155 
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We present the results of the only Randomized Controlled Trial to date that measures the effects 156 
of a conservation incentive scheme on environmental and social values and beliefs among 157 
community members. In this paper, we experimentally evaluate the impact of a PES-like program, 158 
called Watershared, that features two specific design features intended to reduce the risk of 159 
motivation crowding: the use of in-kind payments and framing that references local reciprocity 160 
norms. We use before and after data from households in communities randomly allocated to be 161 
offered Watershared agreements (treatment communities) or not (control communities) to evaluate 162 
the extent to which the scheme resulted in motivation crowding related to environmental and social 163 
values and beliefs. 164 
 165 
2. Environmental and Social Values and Beliefs 166 
The theory of motivation crowding primarily focuses on how motivation for future behavior will 167 
be affected after incentive programs end and the new, external motivation is no longer a direct 168 
driver (Andersson et al. 2018). However, as they have not yet happened, future environmental 169 
behaviors and the motivations behind them are difficult to observe directly. As a result, studies of 170 
motivation crowding often focus instead on values and beliefs which are commonly understood to 171 
be important precursors to motivations for pro-environmental behaviors. If PES and PES-like 172 
programs affect motivations for future environmental behaviors, they likely do so through changes 173 
to individual values and beliefs.  174 
 175 
Terms such as values and beliefs can be used to mean subtly different things. Our goal is not to 176 
contribute to the theoretical arguments relating to these definitions but to examine shifts in mental 177 
assessments that people might make as the result of experiencing a PES or PES-like intervention, 178 
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and which, in turn, could influence later motivations for environmental behavior. Values can be 179 
understood as universally held guiding principles for decisions that people make in their lives 180 
(Schwartz 1992, p.21), thus providing a direct precursor to motivations for behavior. Much of the 181 
literature on motivations for environmental behavior, specifically, focuses on four key types of 182 
values: (i) hedonic or short-term pleasure-seeking values, (ii) egoistic or market values, (iii) 183 
altruistic or pro-social values and (iv) biospheric or environmental values (Steg & DeGroot 2012, 184 
Steg et al. 2014b). Given the importance of both environmental and social values in motivating 185 
environmental behaviors (Rode, Gómez-Baggethun & Krause 2015), there is a risk if either or 186 
both are crowded out by financial incentives. 187 
 188 
There is evidence that those who endorse either environmental or social values are typically more 189 
motivated to engage in pro-environmental behaviors (Steg et al. 2014a, Steg et al. 2014b, Nordlund 190 
& Garvill 2002, Stern et al. 1995, Thogersen & Olander 2002). However, it is well recognized that 191 
values alone are insufficient to motivate action. In order to take action, people must not only place 192 
value on something, but also hold related beliefs, for example believing that the thing they value 193 
is affected through their own individual actions (Schwartz 1970, 1977, Stern et al. 1995). We 194 
define a belief as “any proposition that is accepted as true” (Colman 2001, as cited in Kenter et al. 195 
2015), which is broad enough to include both value-laden attitudes and norms, as well as mere 196 
descriptive perceptions of the world. The particular beliefs we measure in this paper are those that 197 
seem most directly related to PES interventions: perceptions of a trade-off between environmental 198 
conservation and economic growth, and views on inequality and egalitarian norms (see Table 1). 199 
These touch directly on the two primary critiques of mainstream PES: (i) that they may lead to 200 
“commodity fetishism” whereby perceptions shift toward viewing the forest as an economic 201 
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commodity, and (ii) that they may exacerbate inequalities in communities, with related impacts on 202 
perceptions of those inequalities. The intervention we examine here made explicit efforts to avoid 203 
these pitfalls through its use of in-kind incentives and reciprocity framing.  204 
 205 
3. The Intervention: Watershared 206 
In 2003 the non-governmental organization Fundación Natura Bolivia (Natura), in cooperation 207 
with several municipal governments, began using in-kind incentives to encourage conservation in 208 
the Andean region of Bolivia. Their program, now called Watershared, aims to slow deforestation 209 
and maintain supplies of high quality water available to communities. The program provides 210 
modest development support in exchange for avoiding deforestation and excluding livestock from 211 
riparian forest. Natura first visited each treatment community to offer a series of information 212 
sessions presenting their compensations as “reciprocal watershed agreements” and likening the 213 
arrangements to existing reciprocity norms that are common in the region (Bétrisey & Mager 2014; 214 
Capuma 2007). The information sessions characterized the program as establishing a reciprocal 215 
relationship between (i) Natura and those entering into the Watershared agreements, (ii) upstream 216 
and downstream water users, as well as between (iii) human beings and the natural environment. 217 
The original definition of PES involves buyers and sellers of services (Wunder 2007), 218 
while Watershared simply incentivizes landowners to conserve their watersheds. However, the 219 
intervention does involve “voluntary transactions between service users and service providers that 220 
are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management for generating offsite services” 221 
(Wunder 2015) and so consideration of the Watershared scheme is relevant to those interested in 222 
the design of conservation incentive schemes such as PES. As of 2016, 210,000 hectares of forest 223 
 10 
owned by 4,500 households were under some version of Natura’s Watershared conservation 224 
agreements (Asquith 2016). 225 
 226 
In our study setting, households enrolling land in Watershared agreements were provided with 227 
development projects with a value of $100 (as a one-off enrollment bonus) plus a variable amount 228 
(ranging from $1-$10) per hectare conserved, depending on the type of land and the rules they 229 
agreed to follow, which could include restrictions on both deforestation and degradation due to 230 
cattle grazing. Between the 1960s and early 2000s, deforestation in the Bolivian lowlands 231 
increased from about 4.7x104 hectares/year to more than 2.9x105 hectares/year (Killeen et al. 232 
2008). During the ten years prior to our baseline survey, deforestation in our specific study area 233 
was approximately 4,147hectares, with a mean deforestation rate of 1.2% per community (Wiik et 234 
al. 2019). The goal of the Watershared program was to limit forest degradation, as well as 235 
deforestation. In particular, the agreements targeted the issue of cattle grazing in the watershed, 236 
which can lead to fecal contamination of the water source (Crane et al. 1983, Sunohara et al. 2012) 237 
and creates risks for biodiversity (Stern et al. 2002).  238 
 239 
Payments were made in the form of inputs for sustainable livelihoods, such as fruit trees, 240 
beekeeping equipment, irrigation tubing, or barbed wire (to help enclose the cattle and keep them 241 
away from the watershed). Agreements (for three years) were offered on an individual basis 242 
(Pynegar et al. 2018). Previous research on Watershared found that take-up was determined by a 243 
combination of financial and social characteristics, with poorer community members less able to 244 
participate (Grillos 2017) and that those motivated by pro-nature instrumental motivations were 245 
more likely to enroll land which resulted in additional conservation (Bottazzi et al. 2018). In this 246 
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study, we examine whether experiencing the intervention has changed prioritization of 247 
environmental and social values, and whether it affected self-stated agreement with normative 248 
statements related to inequality and the environment. 249 
 250 
4. Research Design 251 
4.1 A Randomized Controlled Trial in Bolivia 252 
The Watershared intervention we study here took the form of a randomized controlled trial within 253 
the Río Grande Valles Cruceños (RG-VC) Natural Integrated Management Area. The RG-VC is a 254 
mixed-use protected area, meaning that, while it is identified as an important ecosystem in need of 255 
protection, the government also recognizes the rights of pre-existing forest dwellers to use their 256 
own land as they deem appropriate. Natura identified 129 villages inside the RG-VC and 257 
conducted a pre-intervention survey with households in all of those communities in late 2010. 258 
After stratifying by municipality, village size and number of cattle in the community, they then 259 
randomly selected 65 villages out of the original 129 included in the survey.4 Individuals in these 260 
randomly selected villages were offered the opportunity to enroll their land in Watershared 261 
agreements, while the remaining communities constituted a control group (Pynegar et al. 2018). 262 
Five years later, in late 2015, we implemented a follow-up survey with the same households in all 263 
villages (those that received the program as well as those that did not), generating a panel dataset 264 
(Bottazzi et al. 2017). Two papers have been published using the RCT. Pynegar et al. (2018) 265 
examined the impact of the intervention on water quality (in terms of E. coli contamination of 266 
water used for human consumption) and found no impact. Wiik et al. (2019) showed that the 267 
                                               
4 The study sample originally involved 130 villages, but one of the randomly selected control villages later turned 
out to be located outside the designated study area, so the baseline survey was not conducted there and it was 
dropped from all analyses. 
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intervention had limited impact on slowing deforestation (using the Global Forest Change data). 268 
Ours is the first paper to make use of the household survey data related to this intervention.  269 
 270 
The randomized design of the intervention eliminates concerns over selection bias (Duflo et al. 271 
2007), and balance tests confirm that the treatment and control groups did not differ substantially 272 
at the outset on neither demographic characteristics nor our key outcome variables (See Appendix 273 
A). However, those sampled in the treatment group were less likely to be active members of the 274 
community council (called the organización territorial de base, or “OTB”), which previous 275 
research also cited as an important predictor of program take-up (Grillos 2017). We address this 276 
issue in the analytic methods section. 277 
 278 
4.2 The Dataset 279 
Two thousand, six hundred and one (2,601) households were included in the pre-treatment baseline 280 
survey. Of these, 55% (1,443 households) reside in one of the 65 treatment villages, and the other 281 
45% (1,158) reside in one of the 64 control villages. Of those initially surveyed within treatment 282 
villages, 38% (548 households) took up Watershared agreements. Since some families live in one 283 
community but simultaneously own land in another, there was a small amount of contamination in 284 
the control group, with 32 (out of 1,158 control households) reporting they took up a Watershared 285 
agreement. We directly address this two-sided noncompliance in the analytic methods section 286 
below. The post-treatment endline resurveyed 1,672 of those covered in the baseline. Attrition was 287 
due to a combination of people moving away (there is high rural depopulation in this part of 288 
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Bolivia) and not being available.5 Attrition was not correlated with any of our key outcome 289 
variables, although the subset that was re-surveyed at endline did differ on some control variables.6  290 
Of those households surveyed at both baseline and endline, 58% (970 households) were in the 291 
treatment group, and 38% (548 households) of those had entered into Watershared agreements.  292 
 293 
The full survey instrument is archived alongside the full dataset [dataset] (Bottazzi et al. 2017). 294 
The full text of the particular questions we identified as measuring environmental and social values 295 
and beliefs is included in the next section (translated into English). Some of these questions were 296 
initially removed from the post-treatment survey because of concerns about the length of the 297 
survey. Due to their scholarly interest, they were then reintroduced in the remaining surveys. For 298 
this reason, the sample size for some of these analyses is much more limited than the full set of 299 
households included in the more general survey. There were 333 households that received the full 300 
set of all our values and beliefs questions at both baseline and endline (i.e. 666 observations in the 301 
panel dataset), and 69% of these (231 households) were part of the randomly assigned treatment 302 
group. Of those in the treatment group, 40% (92 individuals) had taken up Watershared 303 
agreements. Balance tests confirm that this smaller subsample is representative of the broader 304 
study region based on statistics from the full baseline survey (See Appendix B).7  305 
 306 
4.3 Outcome Measures: Values and beliefs 307 
                                               
5 In addition, some additional households were also picked up in the endline survey without having been included in 
the original baseline survey, but these do not figure into any of our analyses or tables and represent less than 3% of 
the total households with whom we made contact throughout this process.  
6 Attrition was associated with, on average, less cattle ownership, slightly fewer people in the household, and less 
OTB membership. See Appendix B for comparisons across subsets.  
7 The two groups did differ slightly in that the smaller sample (who received all the questions at endline) oversampled 
the treatment group relative to the true proportions (69% of the households included in the values sub-sample resides 
in the treatment group villages).  
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The survey included questions about demographic characteristics, assets, education and 308 
livelihoods as well as questions relating to environmental and social values and beliefs. Table 1 309 
includes the full text of the survey questions (translated from Spanish) used to construct our 310 
outcome measures related to environmental and social values and beliefs.  311 
Table 1: Survey Questions on Environmental and Social Values and Beliefs 312 
(Original Spanish in Italics) 313 
 314 
Construct Survey Question 
Values I’m going to present you with some values that may be taught to children in 
the home. Of these values, can you choose the two that you think are the 
most important?  
 
(a) Independence, (b) Creativity, (c) Protecting the Environment, (d) 
Sharing with Others, being altruistic (e) Obedience, (f) Being a Good 
Student, (g) Being Successful 
 
Voy a presentarle algunos valores que se puede enseñar a los niños en 
casa. ¿De estos valores, puede elegir los dos que piensa que son los más 
importantes?  
 
(a) Independencia, (b) Creatividad, (c) Cuidar el medio ambiente, (d) 
Compartir con los demás, ser altruisto, (e) Obediencia, (f) Ser un buen 
estudiante, (g) Búsqueda del éxito 
 
Beliefs Now I will read some statements and I would like to know if you agree with 
each one. There is no correct answer, I just want to know your opinion.  
[1= completely disagree…  5= completely agree] 
 
Ahora voy a leer unas afirmaciones y me gustaría saber si usted está de 
acuerdo con cada una. No hay una respuesta correca, sólo quiero saber su 
opinión sobre cada una de las afirmaciones.                        
[1=completamente en desacuerdo…  5=completamente de acuerdo] 
 
    Environmental beliefs • “In order to improve quality of life, it is necessary to harm the 
environment.”   [“Para mejorar las condiciones de vida, es necesario 
dañar el medio ambiente.”] 
• “We can have higher economic incomes if we protect the 
environment.”   [ “Podemos tener mejores ingresos económicos si 
protegemos el medio ambiente” ] 
 
    Social beliefs • “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce income inequality 
between people with a lot of money and people with little money.”       
[“Es responsibilidad del gobierno reducer la desigualdad de ingresos 
entre las personas con mucho dinero y las personas con poco dinero.”] 
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• “If a person works more than others, it’s fair that they earn more 
money.”   [“Si una persona trabaja más que otras personas, es justo 
que gane más dinero.” ] 
• “If a person earns more than others, they must share with the rest.”     
[“Si una persona gane más que otras, tiene que compartir con los 
demás.”] 
 315 
To measure the relative priority placed on environmental and social values, we included a question 316 
in the survey that asked respondents to choose their top two priorities from a list of values that 317 
could be taught to children in the home. Among this list of possible values were the options 318 
“protecting the environment” (biospheric/environmental values) and “sharing with others” 319 
(altruistic/pro-social values). Our outcome variables related to values were two binary variables: 320 
whether an individual chose, respectively, protecting the environment (environmental values) or 321 
sharing with others (social values), as one of their top two priorities. This question was adapted 322 
for the local context from one that appeared on the World Values Survey questionnaire (Inglehart 323 
et al. 2014). 324 
While environmental values have been measured in variety of ways in the past (Dietz 2005), we 325 
find this relative priority version of the question to be the most compelling for various reasons. 326 
First, we believe it is less prone to social desirability bias. Since all of the values are potentially 327 
viewed as socially desirable, asking about each one individually could lead participants to simply 328 
state that all are important. Asking them to choose between them, however, forces them to identify 329 
those that are of utmost priority, even if all could be seen as desirable. Second, this type of question 330 
is likely more comparable across individuals. Likert-scales can be interpreted differently by 331 
different people, as the dividing line between agreeing “completely” and “somewhat” is less 332 
objectively obvious than what it means to prefer one thing to another. Finally, this type of measure 333 
is theoretically supported by much of the literature on the link between values and environmental 334 
behavior. Steg (2016) argues that the link between environmental values and related behaviors is 335 
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mitigated when individuals are operating in a choice environment where competing values are also 336 
at play. According to Schwartz, “attitudes and behavior are guided… by tradeoffs among 337 
competing values that are implicated simultaneously” (1996, p.121). Values may be culturally 338 
shared, but individuals prioritize those values differently, leading to different individual choices 339 
and actions in practice (Steg et al. 2014b). Thus, it is an individual’s relative prioritization of 340 
values, not their absolute magnitude (which is difficult to measure in a comparable way across 341 
individuals anyway) that is the relevant driver of environmental behaviors.  342 
 343 
This approach is similar to the strategy employed by Agrawal, Chhatre & Gerber (2015) in which 344 
they ask respondents what reason is more important for conserving forests and force them to 345 
choose between economic and environmental reasons.8 Our measurement strategy differs in that 346 
it focuses specifically on values and includes a wider variety of values, based loosely on 347 
categorizations provided by the previous literature on values. An implication of this measurement 348 
strategy is that identification with one value is mechanically linked to the measure of others. Thus, 349 
an increase in the prioritization of environmental values must, by necessity, correspond with a 350 
decrease in the prioritization of other values. However, given the theoretical justification for a 351 
focus on relative prioritization of values, rather than absolute agreement with them, we view this 352 
as a design feature, rather than a bug, of our measurement strategy.  353 
 354 
The survey also included five questions relating to environmental and social beliefs, asking 355 
respondents to what extent they agreed with various statements. These were designed to assess 356 
                                               
8 Agrawal, Chhatre & Gerber (2015) also mention in a footnote that they piloted a version of the question that 
allowed respondents to choose “both.” When they did so, nearly all of the participants chose that option. This 
demonstrates the potential for social desirability bias in questions that do not require trade-offs between competing 
values.  
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two main perceptions that were deemed likely to change as a result of a PES-like program, based 357 
on the two major critiques in the literature identified earlier in this paper. The environmental beliefs 358 
questions aim to assess people’s perceptions of a trade-off between environmental conservation 359 
(biospheric values) and economic growth (egocentric values). The social beliefs questions aimed 360 
to gauge participants’ views on inequality and egalitarian norms. 361 
 362 
4.4 Analytic Methods 363 
We assess the effects of the intervention on self-stated environmental and social values and beliefs 364 
using a difference-in-differences analysis, comparing the change in relevant survey responses in 365 
the treatment group to the change in those same questions in the control group (for all those who 366 
answered the questions at both baseline and endline). This difference-in-differences approach is 367 
preferable, because it does not assume that the treatment and control group would have been 368 
identical absent the intervention, only that the trend would have been similar (Angrist & Pischke 369 
2008). The parallel trends assumption is often violated when there is some sort of selection bias 370 
into the treatment group that is endogenous to the outcome variables (Besley & Case 2000). 371 
However, randomization into the treatment group solves the selection bias problem (Duflo & 372 
Kremer 2005). The combination of randomization with difference-in-differences is particularly 373 
robust, as the randomization means there are likely to be no systematic differences in unobservable 374 
characteristics of the sort that could violate the parallel trends assumption. The intervention was 375 
cluster-randomized at the village level, but balance tests suggest that the treatment and control 376 
group do not differ significantly with respect to most key variables at the household level (See 377 
Appendix A).  378 
 379 
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For the purpose of these analyses, the data were stacked, meaning they were structured as a panel 380 
dataset, with two observations for each household: one from the pre-treatment (baseline) survey 381 
and one from the post-treatment (endline) survey. For each model, we restrict the sample to only 382 
those households who answered each question at both baseline and endline. In the basic difference-383 
in-differences model, each hypothesized effect of the intervention is regressed on a simple model 384 
including three explanatory variables: a dummy for whether the observation was in the treatment 385 
group or not, another indicating whether the observation was from the baseline or endline survey, 386 
and finally, an interaction term between the treatment and endline variables. The coefficient on 387 
this interaction term represents the effect of the intervention (Angrist & Pischke 2008; Puhani 388 
2012).  389 
 390 
4.4.1 Intent-to-Treat Approach 391 
To explore the effectiveness of the intervention as delivered to the whole population (ie comparing 392 
those in the control communities to all those who were randomized into the treatment group 393 
regardless of whether they entered into an agreement), we first ran basic intent-to-treat models. In 394 
the equation below, we describe the basic linear version of our difference-in-differences models, 395 
using an intent-to-treat approach.  !"#$ is the outcome variable for person i in village v at time t. %# 396 
represents the treatment, &$ represents the post-treatment period, and the interaction term, %# ∙ &$ 397 
takes on the value of 1 only for observations from the treatment group that were surveyed in the 398 
post-treatment period. The coefficient ( is the estimator for our treatment effect: the difference 399 
between the difference in the treatment group after the intervention and the difference in the control 400 
group over the same time period. As treatment, endline and the interaction are included in the 401 
model, the de facto reference category is individuals in the control group at baseline. 402 
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!"#$ = * + 	-%# + .&$ + 	((%# ∙ &$) + 1"#$ 403 
While the equation above represents the basic linear model specification, our final models take the 404 
form of either ordered logit (in the case of the categorical outcome variables) or logit (in the case 405 
of the binary outcome variables) models, all with clustered standard errors by village. Results from 406 
the basic intent-to-treat models can be found in Appendix C. 407 
 408 
This basic intent-to-treat analysis applies the difference-in-differences analysis to a comparison of 409 
the time trend between all observations in the control group and all observations in the treatment 410 
group, including those who did not choose to sign up for agreements through the program. This is 411 
an appropriate approach because we wish to understand the overall impact of the program 412 
(including the effect of the offer itself and its likelihood to be adopted). It is also appropriate due 413 
to the likelihood that there are spillover effects within the treatment group, whereby those who did 414 
not directly participate as an agreement-holder might still be affected, for example through the 415 
spread of social norms from those in their village who did participate or through the effect of the 416 
information sessions delivered in all treatment villages.  417 
 418 
In the case of the outcomes derived from the respondent’s prioritization of environmental and 419 
social values, we also include one additional covariate to capture some heterogeneity in the number 420 
of responses offered. While the question asked the respondent to choose only the top two priorities, 421 
in some cases enumerators allowed respondents to name three. Thus, we include a control variable 422 
for the number of responses given, as this of course directly affects the likelihood of choosing any 423 
particular option from the list. Unsurprisingly, this variable is highly significant as a predictor of 424 
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choosing any particular response. Our main results are consistent whether this additional variable 425 
is included or not. No other covariates are included in the main model described above.  426 
 427 
4.4.2  Intent-to-Treat Plus Matching  428 
The randomized nature of the program implementation should eliminate the need to include control 429 
variables (Mutz 2011). However, because the subsample that received the values questions was 430 
not randomly selected and did differ slightly from the broader sample, this introduces the 431 
possibility that the members of the treatment and control groups who were included in the final 432 
sample differ in some systematic way. Though we have no reason to suspect that there is selection 433 
bias into this smaller sample that is systematically related to our outcomes of interest, we cannot 434 
wholly rule it out. Thus, to address this possibility, we also include a matching analysis to further 435 
confirm the validity of our results. While matching alone cannot guarantee causal inference, it may 436 
be combined with traditional ITT estimates to strengthen confidence in the results (Sekhon 2009). 437 
Using Stata’s psmatch2 command and the mahalanobis distance matching specification with 438 
replacement (Leuven & Sianesi 2018), we identify matched pairs between the treatment and 439 
control group. The mahalanobis distance matching uses a specified set of covariates from the 440 
baseline survey, based on prior research into the key determinants of taking up the agreements 441 
(Grillos 2017).  442 
 443 
The covariates used in the matching include demographic controls (the age and education of the 444 
head of household) as well as a combination of financial factors (formal land ownership, cattle 445 
ownership, the number of rooms in the home, whether the household has alternative sources of 446 
income apart from that derived from the land, whether anyone in the household has taken out loans 447 
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in recent months, trust in institutions), community involvement (participation in community work 448 
projects, generations living in the community, participation in the formal community decision-449 
making body), and environmental values (inability to identify forest benefits, whether they 450 
prioritized environment as a value at baseline, and agreement with various statements about 451 
environmental conservation). These covariates were used to identify a matched sample based on 452 
baseline characteristics, which were then incorporated into the basic intent-to-treat regression 453 
models using frequency weights. (Full output of the regression models based on the matched 454 
sample can be found in Appendix E.) 455 
 456 
4.4.3   Instrumental Variables Approach (Take-up) 457 
The intent to treat model considers outcomes of all households in the treatment community the 458 
same, regardless of whether they took up the treatment or not. However, if we believe that the 459 
intervention should only have an effect on those who directly entered into Watershared 460 
agreements, then it is appropriate to instead calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect 461 
(CACE). In our case of two-sided noncompliance, one widely accepted method of estimating the 462 
effect of the treatment on the treated is to use treatment assignment as an instrumental variable 463 
predicting take-up (Gerber & Green 2012; Glennerster & Takavarasha 2013). Because treatment 464 
assignment was randomly assigned and affects outcomes through its effect on actual treatment, it 465 
is an ideal instrumental variable. It can be used to estimate the treatment effect through a two-stage 466 
least squares regression process in which we estimate predicted take-up as a function of treatment 467 
assignment, and then use that predicted take-up as the key predictor of our outcomes of interest.  468 
 469 
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However, this approach assumes that the instrumental variable (treatment assignment) can only 470 
affect outcomes through take-up of the Watershared agreements (Gerber & Green 2012; 471 
Glennerster & Takavarasha 2013). Thus, this approach is likely inappropriate in the case of this 472 
intervention, where treatment assignment means exposure to framed information sessions with 473 
potential effects on those in the treatment group, even if they do not ultimately take up agreements. 474 
We include the instrumental variables approach mainly as a robustness check related to the issue 475 
of two-sided noncompliance. We apply it using Stata’s ivregress command, specifying treatment 476 
assignment as the instrument for agreement take-up. The instrumental variables regressions can be 477 
found in Appendix D, and their results are consistent with those of our basic intent-to-treat models. 478 
 479 
4.4.4   Predicted Probabilities and Other Robustness Checks 480 
Some scholars argue that, in logit models, interaction terms should not be interpreted the same 481 
way as in other models, and that a statistically significant interaction term is neither necessary nor 482 
sufficient for a true interaction to exist (Ai & Norton 2003; Berry et al. 2010). Instead they 483 
recommend focusing on predicted probabilities. To address this potential critique, for our two 484 
binary outcome variables (relating to the prioritization of environmental and social values, 485 
respectively), we also confirm our main results using predicted probabilities (Berry et al. 2010). 486 
See Appendix F for the test of second differences confirming our finding with respect to 487 
environmental values. Though not presented in the paper, we have also confirmed that results are 488 
robust to the use of 2 or 3 nearest neighbors, as opposed to 1, to the application of the instrumental 489 
variables regression to the matched dataset, and to a matched comparison of endline values only 490 
as opposed to the difference-in-differences estimator. 491 
 492 
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5. Results 493 
Using pre- and post-intervention data from a randomized controlled trial, we measured the causal 494 
effect of Watershared on environmental and social values and beliefs. In Table 1 below, we 495 
summarize the findings to come out of three different models: (1) an approach that uses treatment 496 
assignment as an instrumental variable to measure the effect of entering into agreements (i.e. take-497 
up), (2) an intent-to-treat approach that measures the effect of being in a village where agreements 498 
were offered, irrespective of individual take-up, and (3) the intent-to-treat model applied to a 499 
matched sample, where the treatment and control group has been selected to be as similar as 500 
possible, based on baseline characteristics previously shown to influence take-up of agreements. 501 
The first row in Table 2 shows the mean value of each variable at baseline (for the full sample 502 
used in analysis), and the subsequent rows show the treatment effect on that outcome variable that 503 
is attributable to the intervention, as predicted by each analytical approach. (Full output from the 504 
regression models used to generate this table can be found in Appendix C-E.) 505 











































Baseline Mean 0.414 1.432 4.621 0.237 2.886 4.636 3.320  
Take-Up 0.542* -0.143 -0.020 -0.440* 0.187 1.806*** 1.491*  
Intent to Treat 0.199** -0.058 -0.004 -0.142* 0.258 0.513*** 0.485*  
(+ Matching) 0.285** -0.075 -0.047 -0.064 0.085 0.632** 0.525+  
         
   No significant effect 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     Positively influenced 
   Negatively influenced      
 507 
Our results show that the intervention increases the likelihood that people choose environmental 508 
protection as a value that should be prioritized for their children, suggesting that Watershared may 509 
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have resulted in ‘crowding in’ of environmental values. In addition, the intervention alters social 510 
beliefs within the treated communities. It tends to support an individualistic and/or meritocratic 511 
view as opposed to a more communalized model of local redistribution. At the same time, it also 512 
increased the view that the government should play a direct role in addressing inequality. Below, 513 
we discuss results with respect to each of our key outcome variables in more detail.  514 
 515 
5.1 Environmental Values & Beliefs: Crowding in of Environmental Values  516 
Prior to the intervention, fewer than half (~41%) of respondents prioritized “protecting the 517 
environment” as one of the most important values to teach their children. After the intervention, 518 
people in the treatment group were more likely to prioritize environmental protection (Figure 1). 519 
This result was both highly significant across all three model types and relatively large in 520 
magnitude. The difference in differences is estimated to be 0.285, meaning that the estimated effect 521 
of the intervention was for an additional ~28% of participants to prioritize environmental values 522 
who previously did not. This demonstrates a “crowding in” of environmental values. 523 
 524 
Figure 1 illustrates the shift in prioritization of environmental values. On the left-hand side, we 525 
show (for the matched sample) the raw proportion of participants who rank environmental values 526 
above others for (i) the control group, (ii) those in the treatment group who did not take up 527 
agreements, and (iii) those in the treatment group who did take up agreements, both before and 528 
after the intervention. This shows that the proportion prioritizing the environment increased in the 529 
treatment group both for those with and without agreements, although the jump is larger for the 530 
agreement-holders. On the right-hand side of Figure 1, we show the predicted proportions based 531 
on the intent-to-treat model plus matching. It demonstrates that, on the whole, the intervention 532 
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group increased their prioritization of environmental values to a statistically significant degree, 533 
while the control group remained more or less constant.  534 
  535 
Figure 1: Prioritization of Environmental Values 536 
(Left: Distribution of Raw Data –Matched Sample, Right: Predicted Probabilities from Matched Regression Model) 537 
 538 
Descriptive statistics and visual inspection of the raw data suggest that the increase in prioritization 539 
of environmental values occurred among both agreement-holders and non-agreement-holders in 540 
the treatment group. Community members within the treatment villages who did not sign 541 
compensation agreements would still have received the informational components of the 542 
intervention, which the NGO delivered through community meetings as part of the initial program 543 
offer. Thus, residents of the treatment villages would have been exposed to the reciprocity framing 544 
even if they did not receive any compensation, and be subject to any socialization effects that could 545 
arise from the communication alone.  546 
 547 
With respect to environmental beliefs, there was no statistically significant effect on how likely a 548 
person was to agree with the statements “To improve quality of life, it is necessary to harm the 549 
environment” and “We can improve our incomes if we protect the environment”. Most people in 550 
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choosing the most extreme pro-environmental position on a 5-point likert scale on each question) 552 
and these opinions remained relatively stable over the period of the study.  553 
 554 
5.2 Social Values & Beliefs: Altered Beliefs on Inequality and Government Involvement 555 
In the treatment group, there was a negative shift in the likelihood that a household prioritizes 556 
sharing or altruism as a value to teach their children. This effect was statistically significant in two 557 
of our three models, but it was not robust to the use of the matched sample. This implies that the 558 
shift likely was related to particular characteristics of those sampled in the treatment group, rather 559 
than a result of the intervention itself. We thus hesitate to put too much weight on this finding, but 560 
it would be consistent with other results discussed below, including a regional trend toward 561 
individualism, and the notion that the intervention may have strengthened or accelerated that 562 
existing trend.   563 
 564 
With respect to the first of the three questions on social beliefs, the intervention had no effect on 565 
agreement with the statement “If a person earns more than others, they must share with the rest”, 566 
but more than 45% of people at baseline already disagreed or strongly disagreed with that 567 
statement. That percentage increased to more than 70% in the treatment group after the 568 
intervention but as disagreement increased in the control group as well, this effect was not 569 
statistically significant and cannot be directly attributed to the intervention. In both the treatment 570 
and control group, individuals are less likely at endline to favor the form of redistribution suggested 571 
by this question. This may be interpreted as a general trend toward individualism across the region 572 
over time (in both treatment and control groups), unrelated to the Watershared intervention.  573 
 574 
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Relatedly, after exposure to the intervention, treated respondents were more likely to agree that “If 575 
a person works more than others, it is fair that they earn more money” (Figure 2). This result was 576 
statistically significant and consistent across all model specifications. While most people agreed 577 
with this statement even at baseline, an increase in the percentage of people in the treatment group 578 
stating that they “strongly agree” (the most extreme option on a 5-point Likert scale) is what drives 579 
the change in the treatment group. This reflects an increased identification with the notion of 580 
“meritocratic inequality.” It suggests that the intervention may have further strengthened existing 581 
trends toward individualism in the region, as evidenced by the result described in the previous 582 
paragraph.  583 
  584 
Figure 2: Agreement with Meritocratic Inequality 585 
(Left: Distribution of Raw Data – Matched Sample, Right: Predicted Probabilities from Matched Regression Model) 586 
 587 
However, there was also a positive effect on agreement with the statement “It’s the responsibility 588 
of the government to reduce inequality of income between people with a lot of money and people 589 
with a little money” (Figure 3). In the matching analysis with one nearest neighbor, the statistical 590 
significance for this latter outcome drops but is still marginally significant (p=0.069). (Using 2 or 591 
3 nearest neighbors, the p value is below 0.05.) This result with respect to government 592 
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for government involvement decreases over this same time period.) We view this result as 594 
demonstrating an increased belief that the social security net should be transferred from the 595 
community to the government level. After experiencing this intervention (presented as a 596 
government-NGO partnership), individuals in the treatment communities are more likely to 597 
believe that the government should shoulder the responsibility for helping out the poor.  598 
  599 
Figure 3 Agreement with Government Responsible for Inequality 600 
(Left: Distribution of Raw Data – Matched Sample, Right: Predicted Probabilities from Matched Regression Model) 601 
 602 
Respondents simultaneously felt that income inequalities cannot be the responsibility of local 603 
villagers themselves, but that they must be dealt with somehow through government intervention. 604 
Taken as a whole, we interpret these results as an indication that the treatment increased the 605 
acceptability of government intervention with respect to income inequality, despite a strong 606 
regional trend toward disagreement with redistribution in general. The treatment provoked a 607 
change in local perception of distributional values, from a community-based system to a state-608 
based system. After exposure to the intervention (presented as a partnership with municipal 609 
governments), respondents are more likely than the control group to agree with meritocratic 610 
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program had a countervailing effect on the overall regional trend toward individualism and limited 612 
government involvement, by increasing the acceptability of government intervention.  613 
 614 
6. Discussion  615 
Understanding the effects of incentive programs like PES on environmental and social values is 616 
important in order to improve the chances for such interventions to make deep and permanent 617 
socio-ecological change toward more sustainable development. Two major concerns in the 618 
literature have been (i) the risk of crowding out values that are supportive of conservation behavior 619 
(Rode, Gómez-Baggethun & Krause 2015, Ezzine-de-Blas et al. 2019) and (ii) the tension between 620 
market-based efficiency and the equity of PES interventions (Pascual et al. 2010). Our study 621 
speaks to both of these ongoing discussions.  622 
 623 
First, our case illustrates that, contrary to fears around motivation crowding, Watershared had a 624 
positive influence on self-stated pro-environmental values. Notably, this program influenced 625 
environmental values even among those who did not receive any compensation. This suggests not 626 
only that the program avoided the crowding out often associated with financial incentives, but that 627 
it did so, at least in part, through the introductory information sessions, which included framing 628 
related to reciprocity. This complements other literature which emphasizes the role of ‘nudges’, or 629 
subtle contextual cues – as opposed to direct information about outcomes – in influencing 630 
environmental behaviors (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, Ölander & Thogersen 2014). Since framed 631 
information sessions are generally inexpensive relative to other programmatic design features, this 632 
also represents a promising and cost-effective approach for policy-makers. 633 
 634 
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Our results also illustrate that the scheme had influences on social beliefs. The program was 635 
associated with an increased acceptance of ‘meritocratic inequality’ but also increased support for 636 
government involvement in reducing inequality. Prior work demonstrated that barriers to entry 637 
(such as a lack of formal land title) limit the ability of the poorest community members to 638 
participate in this program (Grillos 2017), echoing concerns in the PES literature that barriers to 639 
entry could potentially exacerbate pre-existing inequalities. But our results here show that even 640 
among those in the treatment group who have not entered into Watershared agreements, the shift 641 
in social beliefs moves in the same direction. That is to say, people who have not directly benefitted 642 
from the compensations (but have been exposed to the reciprocity framing) also strongly agree 643 
with the meritocratic inequality statement and simultaneously favor government action on 644 
inequality. This echoes another recent study which concluded that payments programs based on 645 
meritocratic principles need not be in conflict with equity (Loft et al. 2019).  646 
 647 
Our results with respect to views on the role of government could, at first glance, be interpreted as 648 
increased support for redistribution, but our other results contradict the notion that there is support 649 
for direct redistribution between people within the community. (Most people in both the treatment 650 
and control group disagree that individuals are obligated to share their wealth.) Instead this result 651 
seems to speak directly to views about the government itself. This intervention was conducted as 652 
a collaborative effort between Natura and several municipal governments. (Though the municipal 653 
governments did not directly contribute funds in the early years of the intervention during which 654 
these data were collected, the program was always presented to the communities as being 655 
conducted in partnership with the municipal government.) As a result of this quasi-governmental 656 
intervention, people’s views of government and its role have been altered. Contrary to concerns in 657 
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the literature that disenchantment with program-related inequalities may decrease support for later 658 
efforts, in this case we find that there may in fact be greater support for future governmental policy 659 
interventions as a result of this particular program.   660 
 661 
The use of a Randomized Controlled Trial to evaluate impacts of this program lends increased 662 
internal validity to our study, providing one of the clearest examples of causal inference in this 663 
literature to date. However, there are of course still limitations associated with our research design 664 
that we wish to acknowledge here. First, the use of self-stated data on values and beliefs is limited 665 
by social desirability bias and experimenter demand effects, in that respondents may say what they 666 
believe researchers want to hear (Tourangeau et al. 2000). This is somewhat mitigated by the fact 667 
that we collect pre- and post- intervention data in both treatment and control groups (since social 668 
desirability bias is likely to be at play across all interviews), and the research team made efforts to 669 
ensure that the interviewers were not seen as affiliated with the NGO (while Natura did manage 670 
the initial hiring of the enumerators, the unaffiliated researchers trained and supervised them). 671 
Second, given that this experiment spanned multiple years, we cannot completely rule out the 672 
possibility of spillover effects. If control communities heard about incentive programs in other 673 
villages, they may perceive that others have opportunities to earn more to which they have not had 674 
access – thus decreasing their degree of comfort with the notion of meritocratic inequality. This is 675 
of particular concern for the meritocratic inequality finding, since a corresponding decrease in 676 
agreement in the control group contributes to the statistical significance of the result. 677 
 678 
Our results contrast with other prior studies that found evidence of motivation crowding in 679 
conservation incentive programs (Agrawal, Chhatre & Gerber 2015; Chervier, Le Velly & Ezzine-680 
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de-Blas 2019; García-Amado, Pérez & García 2013; Moros, Valez & Corbera 2019), and 681 
corroborate arguments that fears of motivation crowding in PES may be overstated (Andersson et 682 
al. 2018; Handberg & Angelsen 2019; Kaczan, Swallow & Adamowicz 2019). However, we are 683 
cautious in generalizing these results to other incentive programs, as we believe contrasting results 684 
are due to differences in specific design features. In particular, we believe the use of in-kind 685 
compensation, individual-level agreements, and the targeted framing related to local reciprocity 686 
norms all likely influenced the results we present here.   687 
 688 
As described earlier, there is reason to believe that both the use of in-kind payments and norm-689 
based framing may reduce the risk of crowding out. Here we demonstrate that these design features 690 
may go even farther, leading to a crowding in of environmental values. At the same time, the 691 
reciprocity framing may also have influenced results with respect to social beliefs. One 692 
interpretation of reciprocity is an expectation of fair exchange, including potentially that of reward 693 
for effort.9 The Natura information sessions evoked reciprocity not only with respect to human-694 
environment relations generally but also specifically with respect to the compensations earned 695 
through the conservation agreements. If framing successfully engaged internalized reciprocity 696 
norms with respect to environmental protection, then perhaps it also led individuals to feel more 697 
entitled to the goods earned through the agreements – and therefore more comfortable with any 698 
potentially unequal distribution resulting from it. 699 
 700 
                                               
9 This interpretation is distinct from alternative definitions of reciprocity in, for example, the anthropological 
literature, which views reciprocity not as a direct exchange of goods and services, but rather as an indirect and 
delayed system of exchange based on trust and internal cohesion.  
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Finally, Watershared involves individual land owners entering into agreements. Several studies 701 
have suggested that individual payments have different psychological implications for motivation 702 
crowding compared with communal payments (Agrawal, Chhatre & Gerber 2015; Kerr, Vardhan 703 
and Jindal 2014; Midler et al. 2015; Moros, Vélez and Corbera 2019; Narloch, Pascual and Drucker 704 
2012). A recent paper found that communal payments in Mexico had a positive impact on social 705 
capital (Alix-Garcia et al. 2018). Programs directed at entire communities may eliminate barriers 706 
faced by non-landowners, but on the other hand, community-based management programs are in 707 
practice often co-opted by local elites, potentially also resulting in elite capture of benefits 708 
(Bardhan & Mookherjee 2000; Iversen et al. 2006). Even if payments are not skewed within 709 
communities, they may influence inequality across groups, with benefits accruing 710 
disproportionately to wealthier communities relative to the additionality of their conservation 711 
(Murtinho & Wolff 2015). On the other hand, individual agreements can increase the perception 712 
of individual rights to natural resources and, as observed here, influence local attitudes toward 713 
more individualism. We thus recommend caution in assuming that the same results may be found 714 
in communal payment settings. 715 
 716 
5.1 Conclusions 717 
Our results are supportive of the continued use of incentives to promote conservation, and they 718 
highlight a particular approach that has successfully increased pro-environmental values (these 719 
show ‘crowding-in’ as opposed to ‘crowding out’). We also provide relatively robust evidence 720 
about how a carefully designed incentive scheme may influence the perspectives of community 721 
members themselves, potentially affecting the acceptance and effectiveness of future policy 722 
efforts. This work contributes to a large body of social science research about how the form in 723 
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which incentives and information are delivered can shape human perceptions and values and 724 
thereby subsequent policy intervention. It also engages with a growing, policy-relevant literature 725 
on psychology and environmental behavior.  726 
727 
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Appendix 1006 
A. Balance Tests - Treatment vs. Control (based on full baseline survey) 1007 
 1008 
  Control   Treated      
  Mean SD Mean SD  p-value 
Environmental Values & Beliefs:        
"Must harm environment to improve life" (1-5) 1.41 1.02 1.45 1.07  0.355 
"Environment improves incomes" (1-5) 4.63 .85 4.60 .90  0.449 
Prioritizes environment as value for kids .38 .49 .40 .49  0.346 
Social Values & Beliefs:       
"Earn more, must share with others" (1-5) 2.83 1.72 2.81 1.71  0.716 
"Work more, should earn more" (1-5) 4.69 .89 4.63 .98  0.119 
"Government responsible address inequality" (1-5) 3.44 1.51 3.43 1.54  0.810 
Prioritizes sharing and altruism as value .25 .43 .22 .42  0.084+ 
Demographic Controls:       
Age Head of Household 49.87 16.37 49.36 16.37  0.429 
Educational Level 4.65 3.47 4.82 3.67  0.225 
People in Household 3.50 1.88 3.50 1.81  0.960 
OTB Membership .84 .37 .76 .42  0.000*** 
Hectares of Land Owned 25.43 61.77 26.58 63.04  0.644 
Cattle Ownership .69 .46 .69 .46  0.753 
Number of Cattle 12.09 22.60 11.41 17.65  0.384 
Perceptions of Current Situation:        
Forest better than 5 years ago 2.19 .81 2.22 .82  0.350 
Community care better than 5 years ago 1.97 .77 2.03 .77  0.026* 
 48 
Both water quality & quantity is a problem .20 .40 .23 .42  0.137 
All victims of problem  .87 .33 .90 .30  0.051+ 
All contribute to solution  .75 .43 .78 .42  0.205 
        
Total Observations (exact n varies by variable) 1,158   1,443    
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 1009 
 1010 
  1011 
 49 
B. Balance Tests – Included vs Excluded from Analyses (based on baseline survey) 1012 
 All Baseline Re-surveyed only Values Questions Subset 
Environmental Values & Beliefs: Mean sd Mean sd  p-value Mean sd p-value 
"Must harm environment to improve life" (1-5) 1.43 1.05 1.43 1.06  0.797 1.48 1.12 0.414 
"Environment improves incomes" (1-5) 4.62 .88 4.62 .88  0.651 4.63 .87 0.770 
Prioritizes environment as value for kids. .39 .49 .40 .49  0.126 .41 .49 0.427 
Social Values & Beliefs:          
"Earn more, must share with others" (1-5) 2.82 1.72 2.80 1.70  0.472 2.89 1.73 0.435 
"Work more, should earn more" (1-5) 4.66 .94 4.64 .98  0.266 4.64 .97 0.675 
"Government responsible address inequality"(1-5) 3.43 1.52 3.44 1.53  0.654 3.32 1.57 0.148 
Prioritizes sharing and altruism as value .24 .42 .24 .42  0.991 .23 .42 0.796 
Demographic Controls:          
Age Head of Household 49.59 16.37 49.62 15.44  0.909 49.27 16.69 0.700 
Educational Level 4.74 3.58 4.85 3.54  0.053+ 4.84 3.58 0.589 
People in Household 3.50 1.84 3.66 1.78  0.000*** 3.43 1.76 0.457 
OTB Membership .80 .40 .82 .39  0.001** .78 .41 0.411 
Hectares of Land Owned 26.07 62.46 26.85 64.10  0.399 32.36 84.57 0.051+ 
Cattle Ownership .69 .46 .75 .43  0.000*** .69 .46 0.952 
Number of Cattle 11.71 20.00 13.10 21.42  0.000*** 13.68 24.97 0.055 
Perceptions of Current Situation:           
Forest better than 5 years ago 2.20 .81 2.22 .81  0.148 2.19 .83 0.805 
Community care better than 5 years ago 2.00 .77 1.99 .77  0.232 1.97 .77 0.433 
Both Water quality & quantity is a problem .22 .41 .22 .41  0.751 .20 .40 0.367 
All victims of problem .89 .32 .89 .31  0.863 .86 .35 0.150 
All contribute to solution .76 .42 .76 .42  0.915 .76 .42 0.969 
Treatment:          
Treatment Group .55 .50 .58 .49  0.000
*** .69 .46 0.000
*** 
Agreement-Holder (Treatment Group only) .38 .49 .47 .50  0.000
*** .40 .49 0.528 
Total Observations (exact n varies by variable) 2,601 1,672 333 
(p-values compare each subsample to the rest of the households picked up in the baseline survey) 1013 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 1014 
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C. Basic Intent to Treat Regressions: Environmental & Social Values & Beliefs 
 
 Environmental Beliefs & Values Social Beliefs & Values 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
























value for kids 
        
TreatmentEndline -0.157 -0.0281 0.881** 0.326 1.971*** 0.608* -0.724* 
 (0.182) (0.189) (0.328) (0.338) (0.564) (0.304) (0.362) 
        
Treatment 0.00526 0.196 0.391 -0.0223 -0.106 -0.00324 -0.109 
 (0.151) (0.143) (0.257) (0.279) (0.330) (0.239) (0.286) 
        
Endline 0.279* -0.287+ 0.00453 -0.863*** -0.560+ -0.416* 0.378 
 (0.138) (0.158) (0.259) (0.262) (0.291) (0.199) (0.273) 
        
NumResponses   0.919***    1.144*** 
   (0.187)    (0.227) 
        
Constant   -2.450***    -3.379*** 
   (0.435)    (0.518) 
        
c1 1.458*** -3.352***  -0.757** -2.996*** -1.662***  
 (0.117) (0.147)  (0.238) (0.268) (0.202)  
c2 2.300*** -2.884***  0.0185 -2.585*** -0.902***  
 (0.135) (0.143)  (0.240) (0.302) (0.183)  
c3 2.791*** -2.354***  0.162 -2.344*** -0.174  
 (0.151) (0.122)  (0.245) (0.285) (0.162)  
c4 3.527*** -1.177***  1.214*** -1.703*** 0.968***  
 (0.191) (0.116)  (0.250) (0.279) (0.169)  
Observations 3290 3290 642 666 664 662 642 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
D. Instrumental Variable Regression: Environmental & Social Values & Beliefs 
 Environmental Beliefs & Values Social Beliefs & Values 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 























value for kids 
        
TakeUp -0.143 -0.0195 0.543* 0.187 1.806*** 1.491* -0.440* 
 (0.181) (0.188) (0.231) (0.692) (0.454) (0.608) (0.196) 
        
Treatment 0.0134 0.0535 0.0933 -0.0514 -0.0827 -0.0570 -0.0194 
 (0.0646) (0.0481) (0.0600) (0.216) (0.109) (0.173) (0.0522) 
        
Endline -0.0195 -0.0879 0.00419 -0.719*** -0.412*** -0.330+ 0.105* 
 (0.0669) (0.0726) (0.0620) (0.205) (0.125) (0.178) (0.0534) 
        
NumResponses   0.184***    0.229*** 
   (0.0332)    (0.0407) 
        
Constant 1.424*** 4.590*** -0.0161 2.922*** 4.693*** 3.360*** -0.205* 
 (0.0531) (0.0417) (0.0840) (0.185) (0.0890) (0.128) (0.0927) 
Observations 3290 3290 642 666 664 662 642 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Note: The use of the matched sample combined with the instrumental variable regression produces results consistent with this table, except that the 
coefficient on “prioritizes sharing” is no longer significant.  
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E. Matching Analysis (Nearest Neighbors=1): Environmental & Social Values & Beliefs 
 Environmental Beliefs & Values Social Beliefs & Values 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 























value for kids 
        
TreatmentEndline -0.239 -0.144 1.246** 0.136 2.280*** 0.672+ -0.330 
 (0.222) (0.226) (0.392) (0.421) (0.682) (0.369) (0.427) 
        
Treatment 0.188 0.177 0.182 0.188 -0.375 0.0299 -0.0512 
 (0.165) (0.174) (0.313) (0.301) (0.378) (0.343) (0.357) 
        
Endline 0.377* -0.233 -0.338 -0.632+ -1.032* -0.431 0.122 
 (0.186) (0.196) (0.361) (0.370) (0.486) (0.304) (0.401) 
        
NumResponses   1.002***    0.927** 
   (0.256)    (0.282) 
        
Constant   -2.462***    -2.984*** 
   (0.554)    (0.620) 
        
c1 1.720*** -3.341***  -0.463+ -3.264*** -1.699***  
 (0.130) (0.194)  (0.276) (0.305) (0.317)  
c2 2.552*** -2.951***  0.210 -2.955*** -0.910**  
 (0.153) (0.174)  (0.285) (0.331) (0.313)  
c3 2.972*** -2.447***  0.376 -2.743*** -0.0724  
 (0.175) (0.161)  (0.282) (0.334) (0.285)  
c4 3.701*** -1.285***  1.498*** -2.064*** 1.031**  
 (0.216) (0.152)  (0.278) (0.334) (0.318)  
Observations 3564 3560 836 864 864 864 836 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Using 2 or 3 nearest neighbors rather than 1 produces results consistent with this table (and increases statistical significance in model 6.)  
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F. Test of Second Differences: Prioritization of Environmental Values  
    
 Pr(Prioritizes 
Environmental Values) 
Test of First Difference Test of Second Difference 
      
Control Group      
    Pre-Intervention 0.44  0.36 – 0.44 =  0.21 – -0.08 = 
 (0.06)  -0.08  0.28** 
   (p=0.342)  (p=0.001) 
    Post-Intervention 0.36     
 (0.07)     
      
Treatment Group      
    Pre-Intervention 0.48  0.69 – 0.48 =   
 (0.04)  0.21***   
   (p=0.000)   
    Post-Intervention 0.69     
 (0.04)     
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities, Prioritizing Environment 
